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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Terry Hoskins appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Hoskins pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance on October 
29, 2007. (R., p.3.) He received a unified sentence of four years with three 
years fixed. (R., p.5.) Hoskins did not file a direct appeal. (See generally, R.) 
Hoskins did file a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief (R., pp.3- 
9) and a request for counsel (R., pp.lO-15). Hoskins' petition made a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to file a 
motion to suppress. (& R., pp.3-9.) The district court appointed counsel (R., 
p.20) and granted Hoskin's motion to extend time to file a supplemental or 
amended petition (R., pp.22-27). Hoskins filed a pro se affidavit in support of his 
petition, again claiming the search of his vehicle incident to his arrest was illegal. 
(R., pp.28-30.) The state filed a motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.31-33.) 
Hoskins, with appointed counsel, filed another affidavit in support of his petition, 
making the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.34-36.) 
The district court held a hearing on the state's motion. (a generallv, 
3/2/09 Tr.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the state's 
motion for summary dismissal and denied Hoskins' petition for post-conviction 
relief, reasoning that any motion to suppress would have been denied. (R., 
pp.37-40; Tr., p.8, L.? - p.13, L.15.) Hoskins timely appealed. (R., pp.42-45.) 
Hoskins states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoskins' 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Hoskins failed to establish he raised a genuine issue of material fact 
in relation to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim such that the court should 
have conducted an evidentiary hearing rather than summarily dismissing his 
claim? 
ARGUMENT 
9 
Dismissina His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Hoskins contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not file a motion to 
suppress. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-27.) According to Hoskins, he provided 
sufficient evidence in support of this claim to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-22.) 
Hoskins' claim fails. A review of the record and the applicable law reveals the 
district court correctly concluded Hoskins was not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing or post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. Staie, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, lnc., 111 ldaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Hoskins Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled 
to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 ldaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); 
Hasseti v. State, 127 ldaho 313, 315, 900 P.2d 221, 223 (Ct. App. 1995). The 
petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce 
admissible evidence to support his allegations. !&. (citing 1.C. 3 19-4903). A 
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Ferrier v. State, 135 ldaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 
125 ldaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
ldaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal is akin to summary judgment. Hassett, 127 ldaho 
at 315, 900 P.2d at 223 (referencing I.R.C.P. 56). A claim for post-conviction 
relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if the applicant 
"has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the appl~cant bears the burden of proof." 
v. State, 131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); see also Roman, 125 
ldaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Dismissal is proper where the evidence fails to establish an essential 
element of the applicant's claim or does not support relief as a matter of law. 
Coo~er  v. State, 96 ldaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Wilson v. 
State, 133 ldaho 874, 878, 993 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Ct. App. 2000). However, if an 
applicant presents a material factual issue, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 ldaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. 
App. 1991). Thus, to withstand the state's motion, Hoskins had the burden of 
presenting admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
In order to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 ldaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 ldaho 631,634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 ldaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. A r a ~ o n  v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the 
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was competent 
and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 
ldaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's strategic and 
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the UPCPA 
petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. 
Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunninqham v. 
State, 117 ldaho 428,430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). 
According to Hoskins' allegations, in March of 2007 law enforcement 
officers arrested him on two misdemeanor warrants while Hoskins was inside his 
vehicle. (R., p.34.) The officers allowed Hoskins to finish a cigarette and tell his 
girlfriend good-bye before they handcuffed Hoskins and placed him in a patrol 
vehicle. (R., p.34.) Upon a search incident to Hoskins' arrest, officers found a 
spoon with a white substance on it that field tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.34-35.) Hoskins bases his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress that 
evidence. (R., pp.3-9, 28-30, 34-36.) 
When a post-conviction petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court "may consider 
the probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 
127 ldaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642,646 (Ct. App. 1995) (m Huck v. State, 124 
ldaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "[A] conclusion that the 
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally' 
determinative of both prongs of the [Strickland] test." Thus, "[ilf the motion 
lacked merit and would have likely been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be 
deficient for failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have 
been prejudiced by the want of his pursuit." id. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless'it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
m, 134 ldaho 870, 874, I I P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000) (m Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 ldaho 474, 479, 988 
P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)). A search incident to arrest is a well established 
exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); m, 134 
ldaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. Furthermore, prior to Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 
1710 (2009), it was well settled that "when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
that automobile." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), quoted in State 
v. Bromgard, 139 ldaho 375, 379, 79 P.3d 734, 738 (Ct. App. 2003).' 
The United States Supreme Court revisited the Belton rule, however, in 
m. Gant "was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and 
locked in the back of a patrol car, [and] police officers searched his car and 
' in State v. Charpentier, the ldaho Supreme Court adopted the rule established 
by the United States Supreme Court in Beli.on "as the proper interpretation of 
Article I, 5 17 of the ldaho Constitution." 131 ldaho 649, 652, 962 P.2d 1033, 
1037 (1998). 
discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat." 129 S.Ct. 1710, 
1714. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the Belton rule did not "justify the 
search in [Gant's] case" because "Gant could not have accessed his car to 
retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search." The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court and held that "[plolice may 
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search 
or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of 
arrest." a, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1724. Gant was decided about two years after the 
entry of judgment against Hoskins, and about a month after the dismissal of his 
post-conviction petition. 
Hoskins admits that had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress he "would 
have requested relief that appeared to be unavailable under exisfing ldaho 
precedenf." (Appellant's brief, p.23 (emphasis in original).) Hoskins, however, 
argues that due to differing interpretations of Belton and Thorton over the years 
(Appellant's brief, pp.23-27), "competent counsel would have challenged the 
search in Mr. Hoskins' case as having exceeded that which was permitted under 
the 'search incident to arrest' exception to the warrant requirement. And . . . 
ldaho precedent notwithstanding, that motion should have been successful " 
(Appellant's brief, p.27). 
The search, at the time of Hoskins' arrest, was legally conducted as a 
search incident to arrest under existing ldaho and U.S. law.* At the hearing on 
the motion for summary disposition, the district court heard argument on, and 
considered the probability of, the success of the suppression motion Hoskins 
claims his trial counsel should have filed. The district court found that whether 
Hoskins was inside his vehicle or "had been removed, based on the current 
status of ldaho law, that search could have taken place and was, therefore, a 
proper warrrantless search of that vehicle pursuant to ldaho law." (Tr., p.12, 
Ls.8-11.) The district court went on to explain that it would not have granted a 
motion to suppress by Hoskins' trial counsel and did "not see any basis of why 
any other court would [have] suppressed that evidence." (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-21.) 
Hoskins failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact to demonstrate 
deficient performance on the part of trial counsel for failing to file a motion to 
suppress. Given the state of the law in both ldaho and the U.S. at the time of 
Hoskins' arrest, a motion to suppress in this case would have been denied and 
Hoskins' counsel was not deficient for failing to pursue it. Sanchez, 127 ldaho at 
713, 905 P.2d at 646 (internal citation omitted). As a result, Hoskins could not 
have been prejudiced by his attorney's decision not to file the motion. lSi, 
Hoskins, then, has failed to establish the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed Hoskins' petition for post-conviction relief. 
The state notes that Hoskins has failed to articulate how he would have 
prevailed on his suppression motion even in light of m. He merely assumes 
he would have. (Appellant's brief, p.27.) 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Hoskins' petition for post-conviction relief. 
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